Do ex-bureaucrats on boards improve efficiency in intellectual capital? Evidence from an emerging country

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.authoridDalwai, Tamanna/0000-0001-5754-5384
dc.authoridShahab, Yasir/0000-0001-5140-9453
dc.authoridarioglu, emrah/0000-0002-7168-7968
dc.authoridOcak, Murat/0000-0002-8662-189X
dc.authorwosidDalwai, Tamanna/M-1176-2018
dc.authorwosidShahab, Yasir/V-6740-2017
dc.authorwosidOcak, Murat/V-1731-2018
dc.contributor.authorOcak, Murat
dc.contributor.authorDalwai, Tamanna
dc.contributor.authorAltuk-Ozturk, Vildan Evrim
dc.contributor.authorArioglu, Emrah
dc.contributor.authorShahab, Yasir
dc.contributor.authorKablan, Ali
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-12T10:54:11Z
dc.date.available2024-06-12T10:54:11Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.departmentTrakya Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractRelying on the resource dependence theory, this study investigates the effect on intellectual capital efficiency and its components of having board members who are former bureaucrats, using a sample of banks in Turkiye. The study uses a sample of 344 firm-year observations of banks in Turkiye between 2005 and 2018 to investigate the relationship between ex-bureaucrat board members and intellectual capital efficiency. In addition to ordinary least squares (OLS), the curret study employs instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares model to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. Our findings show that ex-bureaucrat board members have a significantly positive association with intellectual capital efficiency at banks in Turkiye.Copyright (c) 2023 Borsa Istanbul Anonim S,irketi. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.bir.2023.06.003
dc.identifier.endpage1131en_US
dc.identifier.issn2214-8450
dc.identifier.issn2214-8469
dc.identifier.issue5en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85165607105en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage1111en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2023.06.003
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14551/18960
dc.identifier.volume23en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001075747100001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofBorsa Istanbul Reviewen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectBanksen_US
dc.subjectBoardsen_US
dc.subjectEx-Bureaucratsen_US
dc.subjectICEen_US
dc.subjectFirm Performance Evidenceen_US
dc.subjectPolitical Connectionsen_US
dc.subjectMarket Valueen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectOf-Directorsen_US
dc.subjectDiversityen_US
dc.subjectImpacten_US
dc.subjectInnovativenessen_US
dc.subjectEnforcementen_US
dc.subjectPredictorsen_US
dc.titleDo ex-bureaucrats on boards improve efficiency in intellectual capital? Evidence from an emerging countryen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Dosyalar

Koleksiyon

WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu